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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Laura L. Smith appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding her guilty of aiding and abetting delivery of a controlled substance psilocybin/psilocin mushrooms.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Detectives Clinton Mattingley and Shane Hight were working undercover
arranging drug sales at a bar in Oldtown.

(Trial Tr., p.69, L.18 - p.70, L.14.)

One of the contacts they made during that investigation was with Shawn Kendle.
(Trial Tr., p.72, Ls.18-23.) The detectives received information that Kendle was
"either dealing in controlled substances or facilitating the middle man in
controlled substances."

(Trial Tr., p.72, L.23 - p.73, L.1.)

In May 2012, the

detectives met with Kendle at a bar to negotiate a marijuana sale, however, they
could not agree on the terms of that deal. (Trial Tr., p.73, L.2 - p.75, L.2.) As an
alternative, Kendle offered to arrange a sale for psilocybin mushrooms and
indicated there was a woman in the bar who could facilitate the purchase. (Trial
Tr., p.76, L.7 - p.77, L.6.) Once they agreed to buy the mushrooms, Kendle
went inside the bar and spoke to a female who was later identified as Smith.
(Trial Tr., p.80, Ls.14, p.81, Ls.3-14.) After speaking with Kendle, Smith left and
returned approximately 10 minutes later with a brown paper sack, which she
placed in Kendle's truck. (Trial Tr., p.82, L.8 - p.87, L.19; State's Exhibit 1, Track
B.) Smith then went back inside the bar. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.19-20.)
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After Smith went back in the bar, Detective Mattingley waited a few
minutes and also went inside and rejoined Detective Hight. (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.724.) Kendle came over, sat with them, and suggested they go outside to look at
the detectives' motorcycles. (Trial Tr., p.89, L.24 - p.90, L.5.) The three men left
together and, once outside, Kendle provided them with the mushrooms, which
were in the brown paper sack Detective Mattingley saw Smith carrying through
the parking lot to Kendle's truck. (Trial Tr., p.92, L.10 - p.93, L.6; State's Exhibit
1, Track C.)

Detective Mattingley captured the events with a video recording

device that was attached to his "chest area." (Trial Tr., p.75, Ls.12-18; State's
Exhibit 1, Tracks A, B, C.)
The state charged Smith with aiding and abetting Kendle in the delivery of
a controlled substance - psilocybin/psilocin mushrooms. (R., pp.62-63.) Smith
pied not guilty and proceeded to trial at which a jury found her guilty. (R., pp.7577, 114-130, 132.)

The court imposed a unified four-year sentence with two

years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Smith on probation for three
years. (R., pp.146-149.) Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.159-160.)
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ISSUES
Smith states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Was Ms. Smith's right to confront witnesses violated when
the district court allowed the jury to hear recorded statements of an
individual who did not testify at trial, and did the district court
erroneously allow hearsay statements to be admitted into
evidence?
2.
Was there insufficient information [sic] to support the
conviction in this case?
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Because statements made to members of law enforcement during the
course of an undercover drug buy are not testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, has Smith failed to show the district court erred in
overruling her objection to Kendle's statement about her presence in the bar?
Has Smith likewise failed to establish error in the district court's decision to admit
the same statement over Smith's hearsay objection? Finally, even if the court
erred in admitting the challenged statement, is any error harmless?
2.
Did the state present sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Smith was guilty of aiding and
abetting the delivery of a controlled substance?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Smith Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Admitting Kendle's
Statement, "I've Got Her In The Bar," Because The Statement Was Not
Testimonial For Purposes Of The Confrontation Clause Nor Was It Inadmissible
Hearsay
A.

Introduction
Smith contends the district court "violated her constitutional rights to

confront witnesses" by allowing the admission of the recording of the interaction
between Kendle and Detective Mattingley. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Smith further
asserts that admission of the recording was erroneous because it contained
"hearsay evidence as to the statements by Mr. Kendle." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
The only statement Smith specifically challenges is Kendle's statement, "I've got
her in the bar."

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Admission of this statement did not

violate Smith's right to confrontation because the statement was not testimonial.
Smith has also failed to show error in the admission of the statement over her
hearsay objection because the statement was not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, but was offered to show the context and genesis of the drug
transaction at issue.

Even if this Court finds Smith has met her burden of

showing error in relation to the admission of the challenged statement, any error
is harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the

appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous,
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but gives free review to the trial court's legal determinations. State v. Hooper,
145 Idaho 139,141,176 P.3d 911,913 (2007).
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted).
With respect to the admission of hearsay, the appellate court determines
"whether the district court recognized that it did not have discretion to admit the
hearsay evidence if the requirements for an exception were not met; whether it
acted consistently with the rules governing hearsay exceptions; and whether it
reached its decision to admit the hearsay by an exercise of reason." State v.
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,423,224 P.3d 485,490 (2009).

C.

Kendle's Statement Was Not Testimonial, Therefore, Its Admission Did
Not Violate The Confrontation Clause
Smith contends the admission of the "video/audio recording" of Detective

Mattingley's interactions with Kendle violated "her constitutional rights to confront
witnesses."

1

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) The recording to which Smith refers was

1

Smith contends the admission of Kendle's statements violated her rights under
both the United States and Idaho Constitutions, and contends Article I, § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution "affords criminal defendants the right to confront adverse
witnesses" and that the state constitutional provision is "coextensive with the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause." (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7 (citing State
v. Sharp. 101 Idaho 498, 502, 616 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1980), and State v. Mantz,
148 Idaho 303, 305 n.1, *** (Ct. App. 2009).) This assertion is incorrect. While
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution affords the right to "compel the
attendance of witnesses," it says nothing about the right to confront witnesses.
Nor do the cases Smith cites support her claim that the "confrontation right
provided for under the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Rather, those
cases expressly state that "Idaho's Constitution does not contain a confrontation
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admitted as State's Exhibit 1. On the day of trial, Smith objected to the audio
portion of the recording.

(Trial Tr., p.25 - p.12, L.6.)

Smith argued that her

objection was that she did not have "an opportunity to cross examine [Kendle]
about what he's saying and it's almost impossible to hear most of the time what
he is saying."

(Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.13-17.)

Smith also complained that

"discussions about pot" were irrelevant, prejudicial "404(b) material." (Trial Tr.,
p.6, Ls.6-16.)

The trial court agreed that the audio was very difficult to

understand but decided it would "admit the video starting at 1730" given Smith's
objection "to talking about drug deals." (Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.4-5, p.8, L.10, p.9, Ls.316, p.13, L.22 - p.14, L.1, p.15, Ls.1-2.)
Following jury selection, the prosecutor sought to clarify what the
detectives could testify about in relation to the video, indicating his belief that the
court ruled that the jury would not be allowed to hear the audio when viewing the
video. (Trial Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.21.) The following exchange then occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I have no idea what he's talking
about.
First of all, I think there was a
THE COURT:
Hold it.
misunderstanding. You can play the audio. We just can't hear it.
[PROSECUTOR]: Well, I think [defense counsel] was -[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
material.

Judge, my objection was to that early

clause equivalent to that of the United States Constitution." Sharp, 101 Idaho at
502, 616 P.2d at 1038; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 305 n.1, 222 P.3d at 473 n.1
(quoting Sharp). The Idaho Supreme Court recently reiterated this point in State
v. Stanfield, 2015 WL 1452930 *3 (Idaho April 1, 2015) ("Our state constitution
does not contain a confrontation clause similar to that found in the United States
Constitution; therefore, this issue is analyzed solely under the United States
Constitution.").
6

THE COURT: Right.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Where they're standing there and you
can't make out and all you hear is the road noise and [sic] very
difficult to hear and a lot of the discussion is about marijuana that I
could hear.
THE COURT: Right. And I -[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's my -THE COURT: And I think I said we're gonna start at 1730 which
pretty much eliminated all that was right before the statement you
wanted.
[PROSECUTOR]: So we would be able to go ahead and play the
audio for the jury.
THE COURT: Yes.
(Trial Tr., p.54, L.22 - p.55, L.24.)
During trial, when the prosecutor was ready to play the video, defense
counsel stated: "Judge, for the record I would just maintain my earlier objection
to this[.]" (Trial Tr., p.78, Ls.9-11.) As the video played, Detective Mattingley
explained what was shown. (Trial Tr., p.79, L.12 - p.80, L.19.) Included as part
of Detective Mattingley's narration was the following: "This is after we've come
back.

Both of us have -- all three of us have come back into the bar.

The

gentlemen standing with his back in the green t-shirt to us is Mr. Kendle. He is
standing at the bar talking to what he said was his person that could supply him
with mushrooms." (Trial Tr., p.80, Ls.14-19.) At this point, Smith objected based
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on the "right of confrontation" and hearsay. 2 (Trial Tr., p.80, Ls.20-23.) The court
overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., p.80, L.24.)
Smith first argues Kendle's statements "as heard in the video recording,
were testimonial in nature as they were elicited solely for purposes of criminal
investigation and prosecution" and, therefore, admission of the statements
violated her confrontation rights.

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

identifies only a single statement for purposes of her analysis.
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

That statement is:

Smith, however,
(See generally

"I've got her in the bar."

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Given the nature and scope of the objection in the district
court, and because it is Smith's burden to show error, this Court's review should
be limited to review of this single statement. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc.,
156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted) ("[T]his
Court does not search the record for error, and the party alleging error has the
burden of showing it in the record."); State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 886, 303
P.3d 241, 245 (Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted) ("Generally, issues not raised
below may not be considered for the first time on appeal."). Further, this Court
should conclude that admission of Kendle's statement, "I've got her in the bar,"
did not violate Smith's confrontation rights.
The Confrontation Clause prevents the government from using evidence
of out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant has had the prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v.

2

Notably, Smith did not object when Detective Mattingley earlier testified, "Mr.
Kendle says I've got her in the bar right now, the person to talk to." (Trial Tr.,
p.77, Ls.9-10.)
8

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 460,
314 P.3d 136, 143 (2013). "The Confrontation Clause only applies to statements
that are 'testimonial."'

Stanfield, 2015 WL 1452930 *4 (citing Davis v.

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). It "does not
bar statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Stanfield at
*4 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9). Although the United States Supreme
Court "has not provided a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"' the Idaho
Supreme Court has "gleaned" certain "guiding principles" from Supreme Court
decisions.

Stanfield at *4.

The Idaho Supreme Court summarized those

principles as follows:
Whether a statement is testimonial is determined by looking at the
statement's primary purpose and its similarities to traditional
testimony. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Testimony is defined as "[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51
(alteration in original; citation omitted). Therefore, a statement is
testimonial when "the circumstances objectively indicate that ...
the primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S.
at 822. When no such primary purpose exists, the statement is
nontestimonial and its admissibility is governed by state and federal
rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause. Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, _ , 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011 ).
Further, while a statement does not have to be written or
made under oath to be testimonial, the formality of the statement
itself and the formality of the circumstances in which the statement
is made are relevant to determine whether it was intended to
establish some fact at trial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 827-27, see,
e.g., Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 373, 247 P.3d at 600 (the totality of
the circumstances analysis considers "the formality of questioning
and the extent to which the interview was similar to live testimony").
In essence, a statement is testimonial when it is intended to be "a
weaker substitute for live testimony at trial." Davis, 547 U.S. at 828
(internal quotation, citation omitted).
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Stanfield at *4 (ellipses original; footnote omitted).
In short, "for a statement ... to be deemed testimonial, it must have been
made with a primary objective of creating an evidentiary record to establish or
prove a fact at trial." Stanfield at *9 (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143,
1155 (2011) and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009)).
Smith correctly notes this requirement but fails to actually apply it to the
statement she challenges.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

Rather than analyzing

whether the statement was "made with a primary objective of creating an
evidentiary record to establish or prove a fact at trial," Stanfield, supra (emphasis
added), Smith claims the statement was testimonial because it was "elicited
solely for purposes of criminal investigation and prosecution." (Appellant's Brief,
p.9 (emphasis added).)

The primary purpose test relates to the reason the

statement was made, not law enforcement's motive in eliciting the statement. 3 In

This is not to say that police questioning is irrelevant to the inquiry for purposes
of deciding whether a statement is testimonial. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Crawford said that "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations are ... testimonial under even a narrow standard." 541 U.S. at 52.
However, because the statements Kendle made during the course of the
undercover drug buy were not the result of any "interrogation" by law
enforcement under any conceivable definition, the police interrogation principle
from Crawford has no application here. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 ("Just
as various definitions of 'testimonial' exist, one can imagine various definitions of
'interrogation,' and we need not select among them in this case. Sylvia's
recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition."); compare Davis, 547
U.S. at 822 (statements are nontestimonial if made in response to questioning
"under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency" but
are testimonial if the primary purpose of the questioning "is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution"). Rather, the
analysis must center on the primary purpose of Kendle's statements. See Davis,
547 U.S. at 822 n.1 ("[E]ven when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis
3
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this case, the primary purpose of Kendle's statement was to facilitate a drug sale,
not to provide evidence of a crime that the state could use in a later criminal
prosecution. Indeed, that purpose was undoubtedly the polar opposite of what
Kendle intended. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281 (5 th
Cir. 2012), illustrates this point.
Echols, a confidential informant, made contact with certain individuals for
purposes of making a drug deal. Brown, 686 F.3d at 283. With the assistance of
law enforcement, Echols' interactions with these individuals were recorded,
including the drug sale.

kl

at 283-284. These recordings were subsequently

introduced in the criminal prosecution against Brown who was one of the
individuals involved in the sale.

kl at 284.

Evaluating the Confrontation Clause

challenge to the admission of those recordings, the Fifth Circuit concluded the
statements on the recordings were not testimonial. The court explained:
No controlling authority specifies whether an unidentified
declarant's statements to an undercover officer or confidential
informant prior to an arrest are testimonial, but persuasive
authorities all point in the same direction. In Davis, the Supreme
Court observed in dicta that statements made unwittingly to a
government informant were "clearly nontestimonial." [547 U.S. at
825.] In an unpublished decision, United States v. Vasquez, this
Court relied on the Supreme Court's observation in Davis to
conclude that an unindicted coconspirator's statements made
unwittingly to an undercover officer were not testimonial because
there was nothing in the record to suggest that the coconspirator
was aware that his conversations were being recorded. [234
Fed.Appx. at 314.] Likewise, relying on Crawford, Davis, and
Vasquez, several district courts in this Circuit have held that
statements unknowingly made to an undercover officer, confidential
informant, or cooperating witness are not testimonial in nature
because the statements "are not made under circumstances which

the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.").
11

questions,

that

the

would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the
statements would be available for later use at trial." [Citing cases.]
Many other circuits have come to the same conclusion, and none
disagree. [Citing cases.] In sum, courts that have addressed
similar questions would probably agree that the phone
conversations in this case were nontestimonial.
686 F.3d at 287-288 (footnotes omitted).
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before it, the court reasoned:
Even if the Supreme Court has not comprehensively demarcated
"testimonial statements," every indicator that the Court has ascribed
to them do not apply to the statements at issue here. The
conversations did not consist of solemn declarations made for the
purpose of establishing some fact. Rather, the exchange was
casual, often profane, and served the purpose of selling cocaine.
Nor were the unidentified individuals' statements made under
circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that they would be available for use at a later trial. To the
contrary, the statements were furthering a criminal enterprise; a
future trial was the last thing the declarants were anticipating.
Moreover, they were unaware that their conversations were being
preserved, so they could not have predicted that their statements
might subsequently become "available" at trial. The unidentified
individuals' statements were obviously not "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial." They
also were not part of a formal interrogation about past events-the
conversations were informal cell-phone exchanges about future
plans-and their primary purpose was to create an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony. Applying to this case an image from
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Davis, "[n]o 'witness' goes into
court to proclaim" that he will sell you crack cocaine in a Wal-Mart
parking lot.
An "objective analysis" would conclude that the
"primary purpose" of the unidentified individuals' statements was to
arrange the drug deal. Their purpose was "not to create a record
for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation]
Clause."
Brown, 686 F.3d at 288 (footnotes and citations omitted).
State courts have also concluded that statements made to undercover
officers are not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. See, ~ .
Helms v. State, 38 So.3d 182, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting
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Confrontation Clause claim because it could not "be said that a reasonable
person, placed in the escort's position at the time the audiotape was made,
would have anticipated the statements would later be used for prosecutorial
purposes" and noting escort did not know she was speaking to an undercover
officer or know that the conversation was being recorded); People v. Redeaux,
823 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (rejecting Confrontation Clause claim
because "nothing in the conversations between Osorio and Johns even came
close to 'structured police questioning"' but instead they were "merely trying to
arrange the details of a drug transaction").

Consistent with the foregoing

authorities, this Court should conclude that Kendle's statement to the detectives
during the course of the undercover drug buy were not testimonial.
It is readily apparent that Kendle was unaware that Detective Mattingley
was an undercover officer.

Rather, as in Brown, Kendle was engaged in a

casual conversation for the purpose of selling drugs. The primary purpose of
what he said was to arrange a drug deal, not to create a record for trial.
Accordingly, Kendle's statement, "I've got her in the bar," was not subject to
exclusion based on the Confrontation Clause. 4

Because Kendle's statement was not testimonial, the Court need not address
whether Kendle was unavailable or whether there was a prior opportunity to
cross-examine him. Stanfield at *3 ("The Confrontation Clause only applies to
statements that are 'testimonial."').
The state does not dispute that the
prosecutor did not call Kendle as a witness at the preliminary hearing and, as
such, Smith did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him at that time. (R.,
pp.64-72 (court minutes of preliminary hearing).) The state does, however,
dispute Smith's claim that Kendle was not unavailable at the time of trial. The
record reflects that Kendle would not testify at Smith's trial based on his
constitutional right not to incriminate himself. (1/13/2014 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-17
(Kendle's attorney indicating Kendle "does not want to testify"), p.5, Ls.19-21
4
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D.

Because Kendle's Statement Was Admissible For The Non-Hearsay
Purpose Of Providing Context For And The Genesis Of The Drug
Transaction At Issue, Smith Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred
In Overruling Her Hearsay Objection
In addition to claiming Kendle's statement, "I've got her in the bar" was

inadmissible based on the Confrontation Clause, Smith also contends the
statement was hearsay and should have been excluded on this basis.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) This claim also fails.
Hearsay is evidence of an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." l.R.E. 801 (c). Out-of-court statements
intended not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead offered merely
to provide context, are not hearsay. See, ~ ' State v. Seigel, 137 Idaho 538,
540, 50 P.3d 1033, 1035 (Ct. App. 2002) (evidence that witness confronted
defendant with out-of-court statements of sexual misconduct not hearsay
because offered "to provide context" to admissions thereby elicited).

A party

claiming a non-hearsay purpose "must identify a non-hearsay purpose that has
relevance to prove or disprove a fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action."

State v. Davis, 155 216, 219, 307 P.3d 1242, 1246 (Ct. App.

2013).

(Kendle's attorney representing that she would advise Kendle not to testify
unless "something changes and he enters a plea or something"); see also Trial
Tr., p.14, Ls.19-23 (Smith's attorney referencing prior discussion regarding
Kendle's unwillingness to testify and impropriety of calling him as a witness
knowing he would assert his right not to testify).) Smith cites no authority for the
proposition that more was required to establish Kendle's unavailability. (See
generally Appellant's Brief, pp .10-11.)
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In this case, the prosecutor identified a non-hearsay purpose for evidence
of the statements made in the drug negotiation that culminated in the sale of
mushrooms to undercover detectives.

(Trial Tr., p.5, L. 14 -

p.15, L.2

(addressing admissibility of the audio part of the recording of the drug deal).)
Specifically, the prosecutor argued that the undercover detectives were engaged
in a negotiation with Kendle for marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.9-13.) When the
marijuana buy failed, the negotiations turned to mushrooms.
Ls.12-14.)

(Trial Tr., p.10,

Kendle did not ordinarily deal in mushrooms, but stated he could

obtain them from someone "in the bar." (Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.15-18.) After Kendle
and the detectives re-entered the bar, Kendle made contact with Smith. (Trial
Tr., p.10, Ls.19-22.) Evidence of the statements made in negotiations between
Kendle and the undercover detectives that ultimately resulted in the sale of
mushrooms was admissible for the context of showing the genesis of the crime
and how Smith was ultimately included in it. (Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9. )
This non-hearsay purpose was proper, and was within the trial court's
discretion to accept. Taken literally, the truth of the matter asserted, "I've got her
in the bar," proves only Smith's location at that time-a fact of little utility to the
state considering that there was overwhelming evidence that Kendle and the
detectives went into the bar and Kendle contacted Smith there.

The entire

conversation, however, shows that Kendle and the undercover detectives made
an arrangement for the sale of mushrooms that involved Kendle obtaining those
mushrooms from a third party.

Because the negotiations between the

undercover detectives and Kendle were important context for the crime, and
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were proffered for context and not the truth of the matter asserted, the district
court properly overruled Smith's hearsay objection.

Smith has failed to show

otherwise.

E.

Even If The District Court Erred In Allowing The Admission Of Kendle's
Statement, Any Error Is Harmless
Even if the district court erred in allowing the admission of Kendle's

statement, "I've got her in the bar," any error was harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule
52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. The inquiry is whether '"the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."'
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11, 304 P.3d 276, 286 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis omitted)).
The guilty verdict entered against Smith in this case was surely
unattributable to the single statement about which Smith complains. That Smith
facilitated the sale of mushrooms between Kendle and the detectives is readily
apparent from what Detective Mattingley captured on video and testified to at
trial. Immediately after agreeing to the drug sale, Kendle re-entered the bar and
made contact with Smith who then left and returned within a few minutes with a
paper sack that she placed in Kendle's truck, which Kendle later gave to the
detectives. That sack contained psilocybin/psilocin mushrooms. If the state had
proceeded to trial based on its original misunderstanding of the district court's
evidentiary ruling - that it could play the video without audio - the jury still would
have convicted Smith because it depicts Smith's role in the commission of the
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crime.

Any error in the admission of Kendle's statement regarding Smith's

presence in the bar is, therefore, harmless.

11.
Smith Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support Her
Conviction For Aiding And Abetting The Delivery Of A Controlled Substance
A.

Introduction
Smith contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support

her conviction for aiding and abetting Kendle in the delivery of a controlled
substance. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-17.) According to Smith, "At most ... the
State demonstrated mere presence or proximity to the alleged crimes [sic], which
is insufficient to support her conviction."
argument fails.

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

Smith's

Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence

presented shows the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury
could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Smith was guilty of aiding and
abetting Kendle in the delivery of psilocybin/psilocin mushrooms.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
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reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are

construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d
at 1072.

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Smith Aided And
Abetted Kendle In The Delivery Of Psilocybin/Psilocin Mushrooms
Smith contends the evidence presented against her "merely shows [her]

proximity to criminal activity," not that she actually committed the crime alleged
and which the jury determined the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) In support of this argument, Smith details the evidence
presented "[e]xcepting the improperly admitted evidence of what Mr. Kendle said"
as asserted in her first argument on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, p.14 and n.4.)
Smith's insufficient evidence claim fails for two reasons.
First, Smith has applied the incorrect legal standard for reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence. When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's verdict it does not exclude consideration of
evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Rather, the appellate court
considers all evidence admitted at trial without "excepting" any evidence it may
determine should have been excluded. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 893, 231
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P.3d 532, 538 (Ct. App. 2010).

Smith's argument relying on a contrary legal

principle fails. 5
Second, Smith's argument fails based on the elements the state was
required to prove and the evidence presented in support of those elements. The
court instructed the jury that in order to find Smith guilty of the charged offense,
the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. On or about the 16th day of May, 2012;
2. in the State of Idaho, County of Bonner;
3. the defendant, Laura Lee Smith, delivered, or aided and abetted
in delivering, any amount of Psilocybin/Psilocyn Mushrooms, a
Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance, to another, and
4.
the defendant either knew it was Psilocybin/Psilocyn
Mushrooms or believed it was a controlled substance.
(Instruction No. 13.)
The court further instructed the jury on the definition of the term "deliver,"
and the meaning of aiding and abetting. (Instructions No. 14, 16.) Additionally,
the court instructed the jury that psilocybin/psilocin mushrooms are a Schedule I
non-narcotic controlled substance. (Instruction No. 15.)
The state presented ample evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt.
After Detectives Mattingley and Hight arranged the purchase through Kendle,
Kendle went back inside the bar and made contact with Smith. (Trial Tr., p.76,
L.22 - p.80, L.19; State's Exhibit 1, Tracks A and B.) Shortly thereafter, Smith

5

That said, even without Kendle's challenged statement, for the reasons set forth
in Section I.E., supra, the evidence presented was still sufficient to support the
jury's verdict.
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left the bar. (Trial Tr., p.81, L.3 - p.82, L.15; State's Exhibit 1, Track B.) Smith
returned after approximately ten minutes and Detective Mattingley recorded her
getting out of her car carrying a brown paper sack. {Trial Tr., p.82, L.20 - p.87,
L.14.) Smith walked across the parking lot to the driver's side of Kendle's truck.
(Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.12-14.) Detective Mattingley heard Kendle's truck door open
and close and then Smith went back in the bar and was no longer carrying the
paper sack. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.12-21.) After two minutes, Detective Mattingley
also went back in the bar and made contact with Detective Hight and Kendle at
which time Kendle suggested the three go outside. (Trial Tr., p.87, L.21 - p.90,
L.5.) Once outside, Kendle provided the detectives with the brown paper sack
which can be seen on the video sitting on the floor board of Kendle's truck on the
driver's side. (Trial Tr., p.90, L.6 - p.93, L.4.) The mushrooms that were the
subject of the sale were inside that sack.

(Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.1-3.)

Those

mushrooms tested positive for psilocin or psilocybin. (Trial Tr., p.159, Ls.9-23.)
In claiming the evidence was insufficient, Smith notes Kendle's truck was
never searched for other sacks, the lack of direct evidence that Smith knew the
sack she was carrying contained illegal mushrooms, the fact that the sack was
not fingerprinted, and that Smith was "never caught with any of the buy money."
(Appellant's Brief,pp.14-15.)

None of this, however, shows the evidence was

insufficient. The state was not required to fingerprint the sack or "catch" Smith
with "buy money" in order to establish she participated in the delivery of the
mushrooms. Although the evidence may have been circumstantial, it was more
than sufficient to support the jury's verdict. State v. Abdullah, 2015 WL 856787
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*28 (March 2, 2015) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d
414, 432 (2009) ("[E]ven when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted
consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty
verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt."). Further, it is
well-established that the jury could infer Smith's intent from her conduct. State v.
Elias, 157 Idaho 511, _ , 337 P.3d 670, 674 (2014) (citations omitted).
Smith's claim that "there is no evidence that she delivered mushrooms to
Mr. Kendle, or facilitated the delivery in any way," but that the only "evidence in
this case is that [she] was present in the bar" is contradicted by Detective
Mattingley's testimony and the video recordings of Smith's actions on the date of
the delivery. Smith's sufficiency of the evidence claim fails.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.
DATED this 8th day of April 2015.

JEsrI9A M. LORELLO
Depaty Attorney General
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